Описание
shell-quote's quote() function did not validate object-token inputs against the operator model used by parse(). The .op field was backslash-escaped character by character using /(.)/g, which in JavaScript does not match line terminators (\n, \r, U+2028, U+2029). A line terminator in .op therefore passed through unescaped into the output; POSIX shells treat a literal newline as a command separator, so any content after it would execute as a second command. The vulnerable code path is reachable in two ways: (1) direct construction of { op: '...\n...' } from external input, and (2) via parse(cmd, envFn) when envFn returns object tokens whose .op is attacker-influenced. Both are documented API surface. Fixed by replacing the per-character escape with strict shape validation: .op must match the parser's control-operator allowlist; { op: 'glob', pattern } validates pattern and forbids line terminators; { comment } validates comment and forbids line terminators; any other object shape throws TypeError.
A flaw was found in the shell-quote component. The quote() function did not properly validate object-token inputs, allowing line terminators to pass unescaped into the output. A remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability by providing specially crafted input, which a POSIX shell would interpret as a command separator. This could lead to command injection, enabling the attacker to execute arbitrary code on the system.
Затронутые пакеты
| Платформа | Пакет | Состояние | Рекомендация | Релиз |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cryostat 4 | shell-quote | Not affected | ||
| Gatekeeper 3 | gatekeeper/gatekeeper-rhel9 | Not affected | ||
| Node HealthCheck Operator | workload-availability/node-healthcheck-must-gather-rhel9 | Not affected | ||
| Node HealthCheck Operator | workload-availability/node-healthcheck-operator-bundle | Not affected | ||
| Node HealthCheck Operator | workload-availability/node-healthcheck-rhel9-operator | Not affected | ||
| OpenShift Lightspeed | openshift-lightspeed/lightspeed-console-plugin-419-rhel9 | Affected | ||
| OpenShift Lightspeed | openshift-lightspeed/lightspeed-console-plugin-pf5-rhel9 | Affected | ||
| OpenShift Lightspeed | openshift-lightspeed/lightspeed-console-plugin-rhel9 | Affected | ||
| OpenShift Pipelines | openshift-pipelines/pipelines-console-plugin-rhel8 | Not affected | ||
| OpenShift Pipelines | openshift-pipelines/pipelines-console-plugin-rhel9 | Not affected |
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Дополнительная информация
Статус:
8.1 High
CVSS3
Связанные уязвимости
shell-quote's `quote()` function did not validate object-token inputs against the operator model used by `parse()`. The `.op` field was backslash-escaped character by character using `/(.)/g`, which in JavaScript does not match line terminators (\n, \r, U+2028, U+2029). A line terminator in `.op` therefore passed through unescaped into the output; POSIX shells treat a literal newline as a command separator, so any content after it would execute as a second command. The vulnerable code path is reachable in two ways: (1) direct construction of `{ op: '...\n...' }` from external input, and (2) via `parse(cmd, envFn)` when `envFn` returns object tokens whose `.op` is attacker-influenced. Both are documented API surface. Fixed by replacing the per-character escape with strict shape validation: `.op` must match the parser's control-operator allowlist; `{ op: 'glob', pattern }` validates `pattern` and forbids line terminators; `{ comment }` validates `comment` and forbids line terminators;...
shell-quote's `quote()` function did not validate object-token inputs against the operator model used by `parse()`. The `.op` field was backslash-escaped character by character using `/(.)/g`, which in JavaScript does not match line terminators (\n, \r, U+2028, U+2029). A line terminator in `.op` therefore passed through unescaped into the output; POSIX shells treat a literal newline as a command separator, so any content after it would execute as a second command. The vulnerable code path is reachable in two ways: (1) direct construction of `{ op: '...\n...' }` from external input, and (2) via `parse(cmd, envFn)` when `envFn` returns object tokens whose `.op` is attacker-influenced. Both are documented API surface. Fixed by replacing the per-character escape with strict shape validation: `.op` must match the parser's control-operator allowlist; `{ op: 'glob', pattern }` validates `pattern` and forbids line terminators; `{ comment }` validates `comment` and forbids line terminators; an
shell-quote's `quote()` function did not validate object-token inputs ...
shell-quote quote() does not escape newlines in object .op values
8.1 High
CVSS3