Описание
shell-quote's quote() function did not validate object-token inputs against the operator model used by parse(). The .op field was backslash-escaped character by character using /(.)/g, which in JavaScript does not match line terminators (\n, \r, U+2028, U+2029). A line terminator in .op therefore passed through unescaped into the output; POSIX shells treat a literal newline as a command separator, so any content after it would execute as a second command. The vulnerable code path is reachable in two ways: (1) direct construction of { op: '...\n...' } from external input, and (2) via parse(cmd, envFn) when envFn returns object tokens whose .op is attacker-influenced. Both are documented API surface. Fixed by replacing the per-character escape with strict shape validation: .op must match the parser's control-operator allowlist; { op: 'glob', pattern } validates pattern and forbids line terminators; { comment } validates comment and forbids line terminators;...
| Релиз | Статус | Примечание |
|---|---|---|
| devel | needed | |
| esm-apps/bionic | released | 1.6.1+20160617-git72fb5a8ce29b-1ubuntu0.1~esm1 |
| esm-apps/jammy | released | 1.7.3+~1.7.1-1ubuntu0.1~esm1 |
| esm-apps/noble | released | 1.7.4+~1.7.1-1ubuntu0.24.04.1 |
| esm-apps/resolute | released | 1.8.3+~1.7.5-1ubuntu0.1~esm1 |
| jammy | needed | |
| noble | released | 1.7.4+~1.7.1-1ubuntu0.24.04.1 |
| questing | released | 1.7.4+~1.7.1-1ubuntu0.25.10.1 |
| resolute | needed | |
| upstream | released | 1.8.4+~1.7.5-1 |
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EPSS
8.1 High
CVSS3
Связанные уязвимости
shell-quote's `quote()` function did not validate object-token inputs against the operator model used by `parse()`. The `.op` field was backslash-escaped character by character using `/(.)/g`, which in JavaScript does not match line terminators (\n, \r, U+2028, U+2029). A line terminator in `.op` therefore passed through unescaped into the output; POSIX shells treat a literal newline as a command separator, so any content after it would execute as a second command. The vulnerable code path is reachable in two ways: (1) direct construction of `{ op: '...\n...' }` from external input, and (2) via `parse(cmd, envFn)` when `envFn` returns object tokens whose `.op` is attacker-influenced. Both are documented API surface. Fixed by replacing the per-character escape with strict shape validation: `.op` must match the parser's control-operator allowlist; `{ op: 'glob', pattern }` validates `pattern` and forbids line terminators; `{ comment }` validates `comment` and forbids line terminators;...
shell-quote's `quote()` function did not validate object-token inputs against the operator model used by `parse()`. The `.op` field was backslash-escaped character by character using `/(.)/g`, which in JavaScript does not match line terminators (\n, \r, U+2028, U+2029). A line terminator in `.op` therefore passed through unescaped into the output; POSIX shells treat a literal newline as a command separator, so any content after it would execute as a second command. The vulnerable code path is reachable in two ways: (1) direct construction of `{ op: '...\n...' }` from external input, and (2) via `parse(cmd, envFn)` when `envFn` returns object tokens whose `.op` is attacker-influenced. Both are documented API surface. Fixed by replacing the per-character escape with strict shape validation: `.op` must match the parser's control-operator allowlist; `{ op: 'glob', pattern }` validates `pattern` and forbids line terminators; `{ comment }` validates `comment` and forbids line terminators; an
shell-quote's `quote()` function did not validate object-token inputs ...
shell-quote quote() does not escape newlines in object .op values
EPSS
8.1 High
CVSS3