Поиск уязвимостей

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: VMX: Prevent RSB underflow before vmenter On VMX, there are some balanced returns between the time the guest's SPEC_CTRL value is written, and the vmenter. Balanced returns (matched by a preceding call) are usually ok, but it's at least theoretically possible an NMI with a deep call stack could empty the RSB before one of the returns. For maximum paranoia, don't allow *any* returns (balanced or otherwise) between the SPEC_CTRL write and the vmenter. [ bp: Fix 32-bit build. ]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: VMX: Prevent RSB underflow before vmenter On VMX, there are some balanced returns between the time the guest's SPEC_CTRL value is written, and the vmenter. Balanced returns (matched by a preceding call) are usually ok, but it's at least theoretically possible an NMI with a deep call stack could empty the RSB before one of the returns. For maximum paranoia, don't allow *any* returns (balanced or otherwise) between the SPEC_CTRL write and the vmenter. [ bp: Fix 32-bit build. ]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: VMX: Prevent RSB underflow before vmenter On VMX, there are some balanced returns between the time the guest's SPEC_CTRL value is written, and the vmenter. Balanced returns (matched by a preceding call) are usually ok, but it's at least theoretically possible an NMI with a deep call stack could empty the RSB before one of the returns. For maximum paranoia, don't allow *any* returns (balanced or otherwise) between the SPEC_CTRL write and the vmenter. [ bp: Fix 32-bit build. ]

KVM: VMX: Prevent RSB underflow before vmenter

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: K ...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: VMX: Prevent RSB underflow before vmenter On VMX, there are some balanced returns between the time the guest's SPEC_CTRL value is written, and the vmenter. Balanced returns (matched by a preceding call) are usually ok, but it's at least theoretically possible an NMI with a deep call stack could empty the RSB before one of the returns. For maximum paranoia, don't allow *any* returns (balanced or otherwise) between the SPEC_CTRL write and the vmenter. [ bp: Fix 32-bit build. ]

Уязвимость функции common() модуля arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c поддержки платформы x86 ядра операционной системы Linux, позволяющая нарушителю вызвать отказ в обслуживании

ALT-PU-2022-7835: package `kernel-image-un-def` update to version 5.18.14-alt1

ALT-PU-2022-2339: package `kernel-image-mp` update to version 5.18.16-alt1

Security update for the Linux Kernel

Security update for the Linux Kernel

Security update for the Linux Kernel

Security update for the Linux Kernel

ALT-PU-2023-1741: package `kernel-image-un-def` update to version 6.1.26-alt1

ALT-PU-2023-1684: package `kernel-image-std-def` update to version 6.1.26-alt1

ALT-PU-2022-2919: package `kernel-image-rpi-un` update to version 6.0.2-alt1

ALT-PU-2022-2915: package `kernel-image-rpi-un` update to version 6.0.2-alt1

ALT-PU-2023-1814: package `kernel-image-rt` update to version 6.1.28-alt1.rt10