In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: bpa10x: avoid OOB read of revision string in bpa10x_setup() bpa10x_setup() sends the vendor command 0xfc0e and passes the response to bt_dev_info() and hci_set_fw_info() as a "%s" string starting at skb->data + 1, without checking the length: bt_dev_info(hdev, "%s", (char *)(skb->data + 1)); hci_set_fw_info(hdev, "%s", skb->data + 1); A device that returns a one-byte response (status only) leaves skb->data + 1 past the end of the data, and the %s walk reads adjacent slab memory until it meets a NUL. The same happens when the payload is not NUL-terminated within skb->len. The out-of-bounds bytes end up in the kernel log and the firmware-info debugfs file. Print the revision string with a bounded "%.*s" limited to skb->len - 1 instead. This keeps the string readable for well-behaved devices while never reading past the received data, and does not fail setup, so a device returning a short or unterminated res...

A flaw was found in the Linux kernel's Bluetooth bpa10x driver. This vulnerability allows a malicious Bluetooth device to trigger an out-of-bounds read in the `bpa10x_setup()` function by sending a specially crafted one-byte or non-NUL-terminated response. This can lead to information disclosure, where adjacent slab memory contents are written to the kernel log and firmware-info debugfs file.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: bpa10x: avoid OOB read of revision string in bpa10x_setup() bpa10x_setup() sends the vendor command 0xfc0e and passes the response to bt_dev_info() and hci_set_fw_info() as a "%s" string starting at skb->data + 1, without checking the length: bt_dev_info(hdev, "%s", (char *)(skb->data + 1)); hci_set_fw_info(hdev, "%s", skb->data + 1); A device that returns a one-byte response (status only) leaves skb->data + 1 past the end of the data, and the %s walk reads adjacent slab memory until it meets a NUL. The same happens when the payload is not NUL-terminated within skb->len. The out-of-bounds bytes end up in the kernel log and the firmware-info debugfs file. Print the revision string with a bounded "%.*s" limited to skb->len - 1 instead. This keeps the string readable for well-behaved devices while never reading past the received data, and does not fail setup, so a device returning a short or unterminated

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: B ...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: bpa10x: avoid OOB read of revision string in bpa10x_setup() bpa10x_setup() sends the vendor command 0xfc0e and passes the response to bt_dev_info() and hci_set_fw_info() as a "%s" string starting at skb->data + 1, without checking the length: bt_dev_info(hdev, "%s", (char *)(skb->data + 1)); hci_set_fw_info(hdev, "%s", skb->data + 1); A device that returns a one-byte response (status only) leaves skb->data + 1 past the end of the data, and the %s walk reads adjacent slab memory until it meets a NUL. The same happens when the payload is not NUL-terminated within skb->len. The out-of-bounds bytes end up in the kernel log and the firmware-info debugfs file. Print the revision string with a bounded "%.*s" limited to skb->len - 1 instead. This keeps the string readable for well-behaved devices while never reading past the received data, and does not fail setup, so a device returning a short or untermina...