In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/slab: do not access current->mems_allowed_seq if !allow_spin Lockdep complains when get_from_any_partial() is called in an NMI context, because current->mems_allowed_seq is seqcount_spinlock_t and not NMI-safe: ================================ WARNING: inconsistent lock state 6.19.0-rc5-kfree-rcu+ #315 Tainted: G N -------------------------------- inconsistent {INITIAL USE} -> {IN-NMI} usage. kunit_try_catch/9989 [HC1[1]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] takes: ffff889085799820 (&____s->seqcount#3){.-.-}-{0:0}, at: ___slab_alloc+0x58f/0xc00 {INITIAL USE} state was registered at: lock_acquire+0x185/0x320 kernel_init_freeable+0x391/0x1150 kernel_init+0x1f/0x220 ret_from_fork+0x736/0x8f0 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 irq event stamp: 56 hardirqs last enabled at (55): [<ffffffff850a68d7>] _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x27/0x70 hardirqs last disabled at (56): [<ffffffff850858ca>] __schedule+0x2a8a/0x6630 softirqs last enabled a...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: esp: avoid in-place decrypt on shared skb frags MSG_SPLICE_PAGES can attach pages from a pipe directly to an skb. TCP marks such skbs with SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG after skb_splice_from_iter(), so later paths that may modify packet data can first make a private copy. The IPv4/IPv6 datagram append paths did not set this flag when splicing pages into UDP skbs. That leaves an ESP-in-UDP packet made from shared pipe pages looking like an ordinary uncloned nonlinear skb. ESP input then takes the no-COW fast path for uncloned skbs without a frag_list and decrypts in place over data that is not owned privately by the skb. Mark IPv4/IPv6 datagram splice frags with SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG, matching TCP. Also make ESP input fall back to skb_cow_data() when the flag is present, so ESP does not decrypt externally backed frags in place. Private nonlinear skb frags still use the existing fast path. This intentionally does not change ESP...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: ethernet: ec_bhf: Fix dma_free_coherent() dma handle dma_free_coherent() in error path takes priv->rx_buf.alloc_len as the dma handle. This would lead to improper unmapping of the buffer. Change the dma handle to priv->rx_buf.alloc_phys.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/ionic: Fix potential NULL pointer dereference in ionic_query_port The function ionic_query_port() calls ib_device_get_netdev() without checking the return value which could lead to NULL pointer dereference, Fix it by checking the return value and return -ENODEV if the 'ndev' is NULL.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mailbox: Prevent out-of-bounds access in fw_mbox_index_xlate() Although it is guided that `#mbox-cells` must be at least 1, there are many instances of `#mbox-cells = <0>;` in the device tree. If that is the case and the corresponding mailbox controller does not provide `fw_xlate` and of_xlate` function pointers, `fw_mbox_index_xlate()` will be used by default and out-of-bounds accesses could occur due to lack of bounds check in that function.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/xe: Add bounds check on pat_index to prevent OOB kernel read in madvise When user provides a bogus pat_index value through the madvise IOCTL, the xe_pat_index_get_coh_mode() function performs an array access without validating bounds. This allows a malicious user to trigger an out-of-bounds kernel read from the xe->pat.table array. The vulnerability exists because the validation in madvise_args_are_sane() directly calls xe_pat_index_get_coh_mode(xe, args->pat_index.val) without first checking if pat_index is within [0, xe->pat.n_entries). Although xe_pat_index_get_coh_mode() has a WARN_ON to catch this in debug builds, it still performs the unsafe array access in production kernels. v2(Matthew Auld) - Using array_index_nospec() to mitigate spectre attacks when the value is used v3(Matthew Auld) - Put the declarations at the start of the block (cherry picked from commit 944a3329b05510d55c69c2ef455136e2fc02de29)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: usb-audio: Add sanity check for OOB writes at silencing At silencing the playback URB packets in the implicit fb mode before the actual playback, we blindly assume that the received packets fit with the buffer size. But when the setup in the capture stream differs from the playback stream (e.g. due to the USB core limitation of max packet size), such an inconsistency may lead to OOB writes to the buffer, resulting in a crash. For addressing it, add a sanity check of the transfer buffer size at prepare_silent_urb(), and stop the data copy if the received data overflows. Also, report back the transfer error properly from there, too. Note that this doesn't fix the root cause of the playback error itself, but this merely covers the kernel Oops.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm: clear cloned request bio pointer when last clone bio completes Stale rq->bio values have been observed to cause double-initialization of cloned bios in request-based device-mapper targets, leading to use-after-free and double-free scenarios. One such case occurs when using dm-multipath on top of a PCIe NVMe namespace, where cloned request bios are freed during blk_complete_request(), but rq->bio is left intact. Subsequent clone teardown then attempts to free the same bios again via blk_rq_unprep_clone(). The resulting double-free path looks like: nvme_pci_complete_batch() nvme_complete_batch() blk_mq_end_request_batch() blk_complete_request() // called on a DM clone request bio_endio() // first free of all clone bios ... rq->end_io() // end_clone_request() dm_complete_request(tio->orig) dm_softirq_done() dm_done() dm_end_request() blk_rq_unprep_clone() // second free of c...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: APEI/GHES: ensure that won't go past CPER allocated record The logic at ghes_new() prevents allocating too large records, by checking if they're bigger than GHES_ESTATUS_MAX_SIZE (currently, 64KB). Yet, the allocation is done with the actual number of pages from the CPER bios table location, which can be smaller. Yet, a bad firmware could send data with a different size, which might be bigger than the allocated memory, causing an OOPS: Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address fff00000f9b40000 Mem abort info: ESR = 0x0000000096000007 EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 FSC = 0x07: level 3 translation fault Data abort info: ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000007, ISS2 = 0x00000000 CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 52-bit VAs, pgdp=000000008ba16000 [fff00000f9b40000] pgd=180000013ffff403, p4d=180000...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: mana: Fix double destroy_workqueue on service rescan PCI path While testing corner cases in the driver, a use-after-free crash was found on the service rescan PCI path. When mana_serv_reset() calls mana_gd_suspend(), mana_gd_cleanup() destroys gc->service_wq. If the subsequent mana_gd_resume() fails with -ETIMEDOUT or -EPROTO, the code falls through to mana_serv_rescan() which triggers pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device(). This invokes the PCI .remove callback (mana_gd_remove), which calls mana_gd_cleanup() a second time, attempting to destroy the already- freed workqueue. Fix this by NULL-checking gc->service_wq in mana_gd_cleanup() and setting it to NULL after destruction. Call stack of issue for reference: [Sat Feb 21 18:53:48 2026] Call Trace: [Sat Feb 21 18:53:48 2026] <TASK> [Sat Feb 21 18:53:48 2026] mana_gd_cleanup+0x33/0x70 [mana] [Sat Feb 21 18:53:48 2026] mana_gd_remove+0x3a/0xc0 [mana] [Sat Feb 21 18...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: ufs: core: Flush exception handling work when RPM level is zero Ensure that the exception event handling work is explicitly flushed during suspend when the runtime power management level is set to UFS_PM_LVL_0. When the RPM level is zero, the device power mode and link state both remain active. Previously, the UFS core driver bypassed flushing exception event handling jobs in this configuration. This created a race condition where the driver could attempt to access the host controller to handle an exception after the system had already entered a deep power-down state, resulting in a system crash. Explicitly flush this work and disable auto BKOPs before the suspend callback proceeds. This guarantees that pending exception tasks complete and prevents illegal hardware access during the power-down sequence.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mailbox: mchp-ipc-sbi: fix out-of-bounds access in mchp_ipc_get_cluster_aggr_irq() The cluster_cfg array is dynamically allocated to hold per-CPU configuration structures, with its size based on the number of online CPUs. Previously, this array was indexed using hartid, which may be non-contiguous or exceed the bounds of the array, leading to out-of-bounds access. Switch to using cpuid as the index, as it is guaranteed to be within the valid range provided by for_each_online_cpu().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ceph: supply snapshot context in ceph_zero_partial_object() The ceph_zero_partial_object function was missing proper snapshot context for its OSD write operations, which could lead to data inconsistencies in snapshots. Reproducer: ../src/vstart.sh --new -x --localhost --bluestore ./bin/ceph auth caps client.fs_a mds 'allow rwps fsname=a' mon 'allow r fsname=a' osd 'allow rw tag cephfs data=a' mount -t ceph fs_a@.a=/ /mnt/mycephfs/ -o conf=./ceph.conf dd if=/dev/urandom of=/mnt/mycephfs/foo bs=64K count=1 mkdir /mnt/mycephfs/.snap/snap1 md5sum /mnt/mycephfs/.snap/snap1/foo fallocate -p -o 0 -l 4096 /mnt/mycephfs/foo echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop/caches md5sum /mnt/mycephfs/.snap/snap1/foo # get different md5sum!!

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ring-buffer: Fix possible dereference of uninitialized pointer There is a pointer head_page in rb_meta_validate_events() which is not initialized at the beginning of a function. This pointer can be dereferenced if there is a failure during reader page validation. In this case the control is passed to "invalid" label where the pointer is dereferenced in a loop. To fix the issue initialize orig_head and head_page before calling rb_validate_buffer. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: md-cluster: fix NULL pointer dereference in process_metadata_update The function process_metadata_update() blindly dereferences the 'thread' pointer (acquired via rcu_dereference_protected) within the wait_event() macro. While the code comment states "daemon thread must exist", there is a valid race condition window during the MD array startup sequence (md_run): 1. bitmap_load() is called, which invokes md_cluster_ops->join(). 2. join() starts the "cluster_recv" thread (recv_daemon). 3. At this point, recv_daemon is active and processing messages. 4. However, mddev->thread (the main MD thread) is not initialized until later in md_run(). If a METADATA_UPDATED message is received from a remote node during this specific window, process_metadata_update() will be called while mddev->thread is still NULL, leading to a kernel panic. To fix this, we must validate the 'thread' pointer. If it is NULL, we release the held lock...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: mtk-mdp: Fix a reference leak bug in mtk_mdp_remove() In mtk_mdp_probe(), vpu_get_plat_device() increases the reference count of the returned platform device. Add platform_device_put() to prevent reference leak.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/atmel-hlcdc: fix memory leak from the atomic_destroy_state callback After several commits, the slab memory increases. Some drm_crtc_commit objects are not freed. The atomic_destroy_state callback only put the framebuffer. Use the __drm_atomic_helper_plane_destroy_state() function to put all the objects that are no longer needed. It has been seen after hours of usage of a graphics application or using kmemleak: unreferenced object 0xc63a6580 (size 64): comm "egt_basic", pid 171, jiffies 4294940784 hex dump (first 32 bytes): 40 50 34 c5 01 00 00 00 ff ff ff ff 8c 65 3a c6 @P4..........e:. 8c 65 3a c6 ff ff ff ff 98 65 3a c6 98 65 3a c6 .e:......e:..e:. backtrace (crc c25aa925): kmemleak_alloc+0x34/0x3c __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x150/0x1a4 drm_atomic_helper_setup_commit+0x1e8/0x7bc drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x3c/0x15c drm_atomic_commit+0xc0/0xf4 drm_atomic_helper_set_config+0x84/0xb8 drm_mode_setcrtc+0x32c/0x810 drm...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hfsplus: pretend special inodes as regular files Since commit af153bb63a33 ("vfs: catch invalid modes in may_open()") requires any inode be one of S_IFDIR/S_IFLNK/S_IFREG/S_IFCHR/S_IFBLK/ S_IFIFO/S_IFSOCK type, use S_IFREG for special inodes.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: rtw89: fix potential zero beacon interval in beacon tracking During fuzz testing, it was discovered that bss_conf->beacon_int might be zero, which could result in a division by zero error in subsequent calculations. Set a default value of 100 TU if the interval is zero to ensure stability.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: EFI/CPER: don't go past the ARM processor CPER record buffer There's a logic inside GHES/CPER to detect if the section_length is too small, but it doesn't detect if it is too big. Currently, if the firmware receives an ARM processor CPER record stating that a section length is big, kernel will blindly trust section_length, producing a very long dump. For instance, a 67 bytes record with ERR_INFO_NUM set 46198 and section length set to 854918320 would dump a lot of data going a way past the firmware memory-mapped area. Fix it by adding a logic to prevent it to go past the buffer if ERR_INFO_NUM is too big, making it report instead: [Hardware Error]: Hardware error from APEI Generic Hardware Error Source: 1 [Hardware Error]: event severity: recoverable [Hardware Error]: Error 0, type: recoverable [Hardware Error]: section_type: ARM processor error [Hardware Error]: MIDR: 0xff304b2f8476870a [Hardware Error]: sec...