Поиск уязвимостей

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Detect IP == ksym.end as part of BPF program Now that bpf_throw kfunc is the first such call instruction that has noreturn semantics within the verifier, this also kicks in dead code elimination in unprecedented ways. For one, any instruction following a bpf_throw call will never be marked as seen. Moreover, if a callchain ends up throwing, any instructions after the call instruction to the eventually throwing subprog in callers will also never be marked as seen. The tempting way to fix this would be to emit extra 'int3' instructions which bump the jited_len of a program, and ensure that during runtime when a program throws, we can discover its boundaries even if the call instruction to bpf_throw (or to subprogs that always throw) is emitted as the final instruction in the program. An example of such a program would be this: do_something(): ... r0 = 0 exit foo(): r1 = 0 call bpf_throw r0 = 0 exit bar(cond): if ...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Detect IP == ksym.end as part of BPF program Now that bpf_throw kfunc is the first such call instruction that has noreturn semantics within the verifier, this also kicks in dead code elimination in unprecedented ways. For one, any instruction following a bpf_throw call will never be marked as seen. Moreover, if a callchain ends up throwing, any instructions after the call instruction to the eventually throwing subprog in callers will also never be marked as seen. The tempting way to fix this would be to emit extra 'int3' instructions which bump the jited_len of a program, and ensure that during runtime when a program throws, we can discover its boundaries even if the call instruction to bpf_throw (or to subprogs that always throw) is emitted as the final instruction in the program. An example of such a program would be this: do_something(): ... r0 = 0 exit foo(): r1 = 0 call bpf_throw r0 = 0 exit bar(cond): if ...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Detect IP == ksym.end as part of BPF program Now that bpf_throw kfunc is the first such call instruction that has noreturn semantics within the verifier, this also kicks in dead code elimination in unprecedented ways. For one, any instruction following a bpf_throw call will never be marked as seen. Moreover, if a callchain ends up throwing, any instructions after the call instruction to the eventually throwing subprog in callers will also never be marked as seen. The tempting way to fix this would be to emit extra 'int3' instructions which bump the jited_len of a program, and ensure that during runtime when a program throws, we can discover its boundaries even if the call instruction to bpf_throw (or to subprogs that always throw) is emitted as the final instruction in the program. An example of such a program would be this: do_something(): ... r0 = 0 exit foo(): r1 = 0 call bpf_throw r0 = 0 exit bar

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: b ...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Detect IP == ksym.end as part of BPF program Now that bpf_throw kfunc is the first such call instruction that has noreturn semantics within the verifier, this also kicks in dead code elimination in unprecedented ways. For one, any instruction following a bpf_throw call will never be marked as seen. Moreover, if a callchain ends up throwing, any instructions after the call instruction to the eventually throwing subprog in callers will also never be marked as seen. The tempting way to fix this would be to emit extra 'int3' instructions which bump the jited_len of a program, and ensure that during runtime when a program throws, we can discover its boundaries even if the call instruction to bpf_throw (or to subprogs that always throw) is emitted as the final instruction in the program. An example of such a program would be this: do_something(): ... r0 = 0 exit foo(): r1 = 0 call bpf_throw r0 = 0 exit ...

Уязвимость компонента bpf ядра операционной системы Linux, позволяющая нарушителю вызвать отказ в обслуживании

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