In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: accel/qaic: tighten bounds checking in decode_message() Copy the bounds checking from encode_message() to decode_message(). This patch addresses the following concerns. Ensure that there is enough space for at least one header so that we don't have a negative size later. if (msg_hdr_len < sizeof(*trans_hdr)) Ensure that we have enough space to read the next header from the msg->data. if (msg_len > msg_hdr_len - sizeof(*trans_hdr)) return -EINVAL; Check that the trans_hdr->len is not below the minimum size: if (hdr_len < sizeof(*trans_hdr)) This minimum check ensures that we don't corrupt memory in decode_passthrough() when we do. memcpy(out_trans->data, in_trans->data, len - sizeof(in_trans->hdr)); And finally, use size_add() to prevent an integer overflow: if (size_add(msg_len, hdr_len) > msg_hdr_len)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: accel/qaic: tighten bounds checking in decode_message() Copy the bounds checking from encode_message() to decode_message(). This patch addresses the following concerns. Ensure that there is enough space for at least one header so that we don't have a negative size later. if (msg_hdr_len < sizeof(*trans_hdr)) Ensure that we have enough space to read the next header from the msg->data. if (msg_len > msg_hdr_len - sizeof(*trans_hdr)) return -EINVAL; Check that the trans_hdr->len is not below the minimum size: if (hdr_len < sizeof(*trans_hdr)) This minimum check ensures that we don't corrupt memory in decode_passthrough() when we do. memcpy(out_trans->data, in_trans->data, len - sizeof(in_trans->hdr)); And finally, use size_add() to prevent an integer overflow: if (size_add(msg_len, hdr_len) > msg_hdr_len)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: a ...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: accel/qaic: tighten bounds checking in decode_message() Copy the bounds checking from encode_message() to decode_message(). This patch addresses the following concerns. Ensure that there is enough space for at least one header so that we don't have a negative size later. if (msg_hdr_len < sizeof(*trans_hdr)) Ensure that we have enough space to read the next header from the msg->data. if (msg_len > msg_hdr_len - sizeof(*trans_hdr)) return -EINVAL; Check that the trans_hdr->len is not below the minimum size: if (hdr_len < sizeof(*trans_hdr)) This minimum check ensures that we don't corrupt memory in decode_passthrough() when we do. memcpy(out_trans->data, in_trans->data, len - sizeof(in_trans->hdr)); And finally, use size_add() to prevent an integer overflow: if (size_add(msg_len, hdr_len) > msg_hdr_len)

Уязвимость функции decode_message() ядра операционной системы Linux, позволяющая нарушителю вызвать отказ в обслуживании

Security update for the Linux Kernel

Security update for the Linux Kernel

Security update for the Linux Kernel

Security update for the Linux Kernel

Security update for the Linux Kernel

Security update for the Linux Kernel