In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: ops: Consistently treat platform_max as control value This reverts commit 9bdd10d57a88 ("ASoC: ops: Shift tested values in snd_soc_put_volsw() by +min"), and makes some additional related updates. There are two ways the platform_max could be interpreted; the maximum register value, or the maximum value the control can be set to. The patch moved from treating the value as a control value to a register one. When the patch was applied it was technically correct as snd_soc_limit_volume() also used the register interpretation. However, even then most of the other usages treated platform_max as a control value, and snd_soc_limit_volume() has since been updated to also do so in commit fb9ad24485087 ("ASoC: ops: add correct range check for limiting volume"). That patch however, missed updating snd_soc_put_volsw() back to the control interpretation, and fixing snd_soc_info_volsw_range(). The control interpretation m...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: ops: Consistently treat platform_max as control value This reverts commit 9bdd10d57a88 ("ASoC: ops: Shift tested values in snd_soc_put_volsw() by +min"), and makes some additional related updates. There are two ways the platform_max could be interpreted; the maximum register value, or the maximum value the control can be set to. The patch moved from treating the value as a control value to a register one. When the patch was applied it was technically correct as snd_soc_limit_volume() also used the register interpretation. However, even then most of the other usages treated platform_max as a control value, and snd_soc_limit_volume() has since been updated to also do so in commit fb9ad24485087 ("ASoC: ops: add correct range check for limiting volume"). That patch however, missed updating snd_soc_put_volsw() back to the control interpretation, and fixing snd_soc_info_volsw_range(). The control interpretation make...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: ops: Consistently treat platform_max as control value This reverts commit 9bdd10d57a88 ("ASoC: ops: Shift tested values in snd_soc_put_volsw() by +min"), and makes some additional related updates. There are two ways the platform_max could be interpreted; the maximum register value, or the maximum value the control can be set to. The patch moved from treating the value as a control value to a register one. When the patch was applied it was technically correct as snd_soc_limit_volume() also used the register interpretation. However, even then most of the other usages treated platform_max as a control value, and snd_soc_limit_volume() has since been updated to also do so in commit fb9ad24485087 ("ASoC: ops: add correct range check for limiting volume"). That patch however, missed updating snd_soc_put_volsw() back to the control interpretation, and fixing snd_soc_info_volsw_range(). The control interpretation make

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: A ...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: PCI/MSI: Handle the NOMASK flag correctly for all PCI/MSI backends The conversion of the XEN specific global variable pci_msi_ignore_mask to a MSI domain flag, missed the facts that: 1) Legacy architectures do not provide a interrupt domain 2) Parent MSI domains do not necessarily have a domain info attached Both cases result in an unconditional NULL pointer dereference. This was unfortunatly missed in review and testing revealed it late. Cure this by using the existing pci_msi_domain_supports() helper, which handles all possible cases correctly.

Security update for the Linux Kernel

Security update for the Linux Kernel

Security update for the Linux Kernel

Security update for the Linux Kernel

Security update for the Linux Kernel

Security update for the Linux Kernel

ELSA-2025-20480: Unbreakable Enterprise kernel security update (IMPORTANT)