In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/ntfs3: validate lcns_follow in log_replay conversion log_replay() converts DIR_PAGE_ENTRY_32 records into DIR_PAGE_ENTRY records when replaying version 0 restart tables. During this conversion, the memmove() length is derived directly from the on-disk lcns_follow field: memmove(&dp->vcn, &dp0->vcn_low, 2 * sizeof(u64) + le32_to_cpu(dp->lcns_follow) * sizeof(u64)); check_rstbl() validates restart table structure, but does not constrain per-entry lcns_follow values relative to the entry size. A malformed filesystem image can provide an oversized lcns_follow value, causing the conversion memmove() to access memory beyond the bounds of the allocated restart table buffer. The same field is later used to bound iteration over page_lcns[], so validating lcns_follow during conversion also prevents downstream out-of-bounds access from the same malformed metadata. Compute the maximum valid lcns_follow from the already-valid...

A flaw was found in the Linux kernel's ntfs3 filesystem driver. A local attacker could exploit this vulnerability by crafting a specially designed NTFS filesystem image. This flaw allows an attacker to cause an out-of-bounds memory write during the log replay conversion process, potentially leading to memory corruption and system instability or denial of service.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/ntfs3: validate lcns_follow in log_replay conversion log_replay() converts DIR_PAGE_ENTRY_32 records into DIR_PAGE_ENTRY records when replaying version 0 restart tables. During this conversion, the memmove() length is derived directly from the on-disk lcns_follow field: memmove(&dp->vcn, &dp0->vcn_low, 2 * sizeof(u64) + le32_to_cpu(dp->lcns_follow) * sizeof(u64)); check_rstbl() validates restart table structure, but does not constrain per-entry lcns_follow values relative to the entry size. A malformed filesystem image can provide an oversized lcns_follow value, causing the conversion memmove() to access memory beyond the bounds of the allocated restart table buffer. The same field is later used to bound iteration over page_lcns[], so validating lcns_follow during conversion also prevents downstream out-of-bounds access from the same malformed metadata. Compute the maximum valid lcns_follow from the al

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f ...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/ntfs3: validate lcns_follow in log_replay conversion log_replay() converts DIR_PAGE_ENTRY_32 records into DIR_PAGE_ENTRY records when replaying version 0 restart tables. During this conversion, the memmove() length is derived directly from the on-disk lcns_follow field: memmove(&dp->vcn, &dp0->vcn_low, 2 * sizeof(u64) + le32_to_cpu(dp->lcns_follow) * sizeof(u64)); check_rstbl() validates restart table structure, but does not constrain per-entry lcns_follow values relative to the entry size. A malformed filesystem image can provide an oversized lcns_follow value, causing the conversion memmove() to access memory beyond the bounds of the allocated restart table buffer. The same field is later used to bound iteration over page_lcns[], so validating lcns_follow during conversion also prevents downstream out-of-bounds access from the same malformed metadata. Compute the maximum valid lcns_follow from the...