In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: platform/x86: hp-bioscfg: pass validated element count to package parsers The per-type package parsers are handed the wrong element count. hp_init_bios_package_attribute() validates obj->package.count and then calls one of the five hp_populate_*_package_data() wrappers (string, integer, enumeration, ordered list, password). Each wrapper forwards a count to its hp_populate_*_elements_from_package() parser, but instead of forwarding the validated obj->package.count it derives the count from elements[0]. elements[0] is the NAME field and is always an ACPI_TYPE_STRING, so reading ->package.count from it in fact reads ->string.length through the union acpi_object. The parsers thus bound themselves against the length of the name string rather than against the real number of elements in the package. This is safe today because hp_init_bios_package_attribute() refuses any package that has fewer than the type's element count,...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: platform/x86: hp-bioscfg: pass validated element count to package parsers The per-type package parsers are handed the wrong element count. hp_init_bios_package_attribute() validates obj->package.count and then calls one of the five hp_populate_*_package_data() wrappers (string, integer, enumeration, ordered list, password). Each wrapper forwards a count to its hp_populate_*_elements_from_package() parser, but instead of forwarding the validated obj->package.count it derives the count from elements[0]. elements[0] is the NAME field and is always an ACPI_TYPE_STRING, so reading ->package.count from it in fact reads ->string.length through the union acpi_object. The parsers thus bound themselves against the length of the name string rather than against the real number of elements in the package. This is safe today because hp_init_bios_package_attribute() refuses any package that has fewer than the type's element count,...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: platform/x86: hp-bioscfg: pass validated element count to package parsers The per-type package parsers are handed the wrong element count. hp_init_bios_package_attribute() validates obj->package.count and then calls one of the five hp_populate_*_package_data() wrappers (string, integer, enumeration, ordered list, password). Each wrapper forwards a count to its hp_populate_*_elements_from_package() parser, but instead of forwarding the validated obj->package.count it derives the count from elements[0]. elements[0] is the NAME field and is always an ACPI_TYPE_STRING, so reading ->package.count from it in fact reads ->string.length through the union acpi_object. The parsers thus bound themselves against the length of the name string rather than against the real number of elements in the package. This is safe today because hp_init_bios_package_attribute() refuses any package that has fewer than the type's element count

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: p ...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: platform/x86: hp-bioscfg: pass validated element count to package parsers The per-type package parsers are handed the wrong element count. hp_init_bios_package_attribute() validates obj->package.count and then calls one of the five hp_populate_*_package_data() wrappers (string, integer, enumeration, ordered list, password). Each wrapper forwards a count to its hp_populate_*_elements_from_package() parser, but instead of forwarding the validated obj->package.count it derives the count from elements[0]. elements[0] is the NAME field and is always an ACPI_TYPE_STRING, so reading ->package.count from it in fact reads ->string.length through the union acpi_object. The parsers thus bound themselves against the length of the name string rather than against the real number of elements in the package. This is safe today because hp_init_bios_package_attribute() refuses any package that has fewer than the type's element co...