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ALT-PU-2017-2778

Низкий

ALT-PU-2017-2778: package openssl10 update to version 1.0.2n-alt1

Источник
errata.altlinux.org
Дата публикации
08.12.2017
Дата обновления
08.12.2017
Устраненные уязвимости
4

ALT Linux branch p11
ALT Container
ALT Education
ALT Workstation
ALT Workstation K
ALT Server
ALT Virtualization PVE Edition
ALT Linux branch p10
ALT Server
ALT Virtualization Server
ALT Workstation
ALT Workstation K
ALT Education
Simply Linux
Starterkit
ALT Container

Описание

This update upgrades openssl10 to version 1.0.2n-alt1.

Устраненные уязвимости4

Связанные уязвимости

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oracle-oval
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ELSA-2018-0998: openssl security and bug fix update (MODERATE)

CVSS3: 5.9
ubuntu
почти 9 лет назад

OpenSSL 1.0.2 (starting from version 1.0.2b) introduced an "error state" mechanism. The intent was that if a fatal error occurred during a handshake then OpenSSL would move into the error state and would immediately fail if you attempted to continue the handshake. This works as designed for the explicit handshake functions (SSL_do_handshake(), SSL_accept() and SSL_connect()), however due to a bug it does not work correctly if SSL_read() or SSL_write() is called directly. In that scenario, if the handshake fails then a fatal error will be returned in the initial function call. If SSL_read()/SSL_write() is subsequently called by the application for the same SSL object then it will succeed and the data is passed without being decrypted/encrypted directly from the SSL/TLS record layer. In order to exploit this issue an application bug would have to be present that resulted in a call to SSL_read()/SSL_write() being issued after having already received a fatal error. OpenSSL version 1.0.2...

CVSS3: 5.9
redhat
почти 9 лет назад

OpenSSL 1.0.2 (starting from version 1.0.2b) introduced an "error state" mechanism. The intent was that if a fatal error occurred during a handshake then OpenSSL would move into the error state and would immediately fail if you attempted to continue the handshake. This works as designed for the explicit handshake functions (SSL_do_handshake(), SSL_accept() and SSL_connect()), however due to a bug it does not work correctly if SSL_read() or SSL_write() is called directly. In that scenario, if the handshake fails then a fatal error will be returned in the initial function call. If SSL_read()/SSL_write() is subsequently called by the application for the same SSL object then it will succeed and the data is passed without being decrypted/encrypted directly from the SSL/TLS record layer. In order to exploit this issue an application bug would have to be present that resulted in a call to SSL_read()/SSL_write() being issued after having already received a fatal error. OpenSSL version 1.0.2...